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Geopolitical shifts are engendering a 
transformation of the globalized economic 
order that has flourished in the post-Cold 
War period. This trend runs deep and raises 
structural challenges, - such as the rivalry 
between different economic models, the 
competition for technological leadership as 
well as control over physical and digital 
connectivity. As the European Union (EU) 
now accounts for a lower share of world 
trade, investment, currency holdings, 
defence expenditure, and development 
assistance, this shift has also produced 
growing concerns about the EU’s relative 
decline and its future economic security 1. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
These concerns are affecting the EU-China 
relationship, as they are leading the EU to a logic 
that merges economic with strategic 
considerations. Faced with the prospect of low 
economic growth, in Europe the political forces 
that ask for turning the distorted Sino-EU 
economic relationship into a level playing field 
have become stronger. Through better market 
access, European exporters should be better 
placed to sell their goods and services on the 
rapidly expanding Chinese consumer market and, 
in the process, remedy the EU’s trade deficit with 
China. 
 
For sure, China continues to be regarded as a 
promising export market and destination for 
investment, but the image of China as a fierce and 
unfair competitor has gotten a strong foothold. 
Voices demanding that China take up greater 
responsibilities in redressing bilateral trade 
imbalances and supporting a sustainable global 
economy are becoming louder and more 
determined. A growing part of the European 
business community feels thwarted by China’s 
trade barriers, industrial policies, and ineffective 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Calls 
for more assertive trade policies and trade 
defence measures are resounding all the more 
loudly in the lobbying corridors in Brussels and 
the capitals of the EU Member States. 
 
Shifts in the global distribution of economic 
power have changed the EU’s relative position 
vis-à-vis China and in the process have put the 
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relationship on a more realist footing. As a result, 
concerns about relative gains are becoming more 
prominent. While the EU has not lost in absolute 
terms, since its overall trade balance is still 
positive, the economic basis for sustaining its 
high levels of welfare and consumption is 
eroding. Europe has come to realize that the 
fundamentals of its socioeconomic system of 
choice are at stake.  
 
THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE  
Against this background, Europe’s initial 
enthusiasm for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
has abated. In the eyes of a growing number of 
critical observers, BRI is not only undermining 
the EU’s internal cohesion, but it is also creating 
tough competition for European companies in 
terms of trade, investment and market access in 
Europe and Asia. European policymakers have 
increasingly come to realise that the impact of 
BRI goes beyond the European continent and is 
affecting the power balance and stability in Asia. 
As Asian markets are important export 
destinations for Europe and a majority of its sea-
borne trade transits through the Indo-Pacific, it is 
vital for Europe’s economic security to maintain 
a rules-based order and keep open the trade flows 
in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
 
From that perspective, China’s growing influence 
is not only having an impact on the position of 
the Western developed nations in the global 
distribution of capabilities. It also constitutes a 
challenge to the values and organizational 
principles that they stand for. China’s growing 
economic clout has increased its political 
influence well beyond its borders and is turning it 
into a more confident player. Beijing is also 
developing alternative discourses of modernity 
and spelling out its own narrative of global 
governance. The Chinese narrative questions the 
ability of the present regime of global governance 
to provide economic and monetary stability, as 
well as its authority in setting norms of good 
governance. 
 
Meanwhile, the changing constellation of world 
power is affecting the EU’s appeal as a model of 
integration and its status as a transformative 
power in international politics2.  Europe is going 
through a process of “de-centring”. The fact that 
most emerging countries – and China foremost 
among them – “are accumulating sovereignty or 
the means to stronger sovereignty, not sharing 
sovereignty as the European experience 
promotes, means that the European region 
remains quite exceptional in both its political 
dynamics and its strategic organization3 ”.  
 
Realising this, the EU has begun to take a more 
alert attitude toward China’s rise. In March 2019 
the EU issued a landmark communication stating 
that Beijing is a systemic rival in some areas, as 
well as a competitor and potential partner in 
others4. 
 
EU-CHINA CONNECTIVITY  
This change in attitude has also affected Europe’s 
response to BRI, which has turned more 
ambivalent. For one, the EU remains very much 
interested in engaging with and participating in 
BRI, hoping to shape the initiative, including 
through the EU-China Connectivity Platform. 
This platform offers a concrete possibility to 
engage in mutually beneficial projects of 
infrastructure construction, which would not 
only open up new ground for EU–China 
cooperation but also offer the opportunity for the 
two to join forces to promote stability and 
development in the vast Eurasian continent in 
between them. Seen from that angle, the 
Connectivity Platform is an experiment in 
reciprocal socialization that can bring the EU and 
China closer together5. 
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While substantive results have yet to materialize, 
so far the meetings of the Platform have enabled 
modest progress on: (1) policy exchange and 
alignment on the principles and the priorities in 
fostering transport connections between the EU 
and China, based on the Trans-European 
Transport Network policy and BRI, and 
involving relevant third countries; (2) 
cooperation on promoting solutions at the 
international level with a focus on green transport 
solutions; and (3) concrete projects based on 
agreed criteria including sustainability, 
transparency, inclusiveness, and a level playing 
field6.    
 
As to future progress, much will depend on the 
extent to which analyses and viewpoints evolve 
and become increasingly aligned, and successful 
cooperative projects can be set up. If that would 
be the case, participants on both sides are more 
likely to gravitate toward consensus and step up 
their engagement in shaping a new order in 
concert. 
 
CHALLENGES  
However, along with opportunities, there is an 
increasing awareness among European 
policymakers of the challenges posed by BRI. In 
the spring of 2019, EU ambassadors in China 
issued a report that was very critical of the BRI 
for being economically, environmentally, socially, 
and financially unsustainable. The report also 
criticized China for discriminating against foreign 
businesses, the lack of transparent tender 
procedures, and the limited market access for 
European businesses in China7.   
 
China’s growing involvement in the EU and its 
neighbourhood has also raised concerns. A telling 
example is Montenegro, “which in 2014 
concluded an agreement with China Exim Bank 
on the financing for 85 percent of a highway 
construction project, with the estimated cost 
close to 25 percent of the country’s GDP. The 
IMF has repeatedly stated that construction 
should only continue on the basis of concessional 
loans. Many believe that a debt default is likely, 
which may result in the involuntary handover of 
critical infrastructure to China. There is already 
worrying precedent in that regard. Sri Lanka has 
been unable to repay Chinese loans for the 
construction of the Hambantota port. As a result, 
the port and surrounding acres of land, 
strategically located at the crossroads of the 
Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian 
Sea, will now be under Chinese control until the 
year 21168”. 
 
Likewise, “China’s entire or partial acquisition of 
ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, 
and most notably Greece”, has generated mixed 
feelings9.  In the absence of serious monitoring, 
China is buying up strategic infrastructure in 
Europe, whereas European foreign direct 
investment in China remains highly restricted. 
 
European officials have also raised questions 
about the environmental and economic 
sustainability of various Chinese connectivity 
projects. For example, the planned construction 
of six coal-based power plants in Pakistan, whose 
joint output capacity equals 27 percent of the 
country’s current capacity, has been criticized as 
environmentally unsustainable10.   
All this has increased EU concerns about China’s 
expanding influence in Asia, Central Asia, and 
Europe, which is not only about money and 
politics, but also involves technical standards and 
unbalanced trade. 
 
EU STRATEGY 
To better secure its own political and economic 
interests, the EU has launched a new strategy for 
connecting Europe and Asia11.  The strategy's 
emphasis is on sustainable, comprehensive and 
rules-based connectivity. Investments should 
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respect labour rights, avoid political and financial 
dependencies, and guarantee a level playing field 
for businesses. The strategy offers Asian and 
European states an alternative for BRI and 
indicates how the EU wishes to engage with them 
and what they can expect. 
A crucial factor is the feasibility of the project, 
which will depend heavily on the allocation of 
sufficient funds by the EU, and the mobilization 
of additional investment from private and 
multilateral investors. United support from 
member states is crucial and outreach programs 
to get pivotal EU partners on board – including 
China – also need -  to be put in place. 
At any rate, the EU means business. Testifying to 
this is the recent signing by the EU and Japan of 
an ambitious deal to build infrastructure and set 
development standards in joint projects around 
the world. It is a riposte to China’s growing 
assertiveness in regional and global order-
shaping. The so-called EU-Japan connectivity 
partnership “will cover sectors from transport to 
digital industries as part of a wider effort to revive 
multilateral cooperation in the face of the US 
withdrawal from international agreements such 
as the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate 
change agreement”12.  In line with the principles 
laid down in the EU’s new connectivity strategy, 
the EU-Japan agreement calls for transparent 
procurement practices, the ensuring of debt 
sustainability and high standards of economic, 
fiscal, financial, social and environmental 
sustainability. 
As the geopolitical competition in Eurasia is set 
to increase, with China, Russia, the United States 
and the EU competing for influence, the new 
connectivity strategy shows the EU’s ambition to 
be part of the game. The infrastructure drive 
resonates with a wider EU push to transform 
itself into a true strategic player — “to better use 
the bloc’s economic heft in trade, aid and 
investment to achieve strategic foreign policy 
goals”13. 
CONCLUSION 
This strategic move has implications for EU-
China connectivity. With the boundary 
conditions of their relationship in flux, 
cooperation between China and the EU on BRI 
faces serious challenges. While they have many 
interests in common, they are also competitors 
and rivals within the confines of an international 
order under stress. The relationship between 
China and the EU is mixed, consisting of 
cooperative and competitive elements. Two 
distinct underlying logics drive it: a power-based 
one and a transformational one14.   
The power-based logic rests on a belief that 
because of anarchy it is impossible to overcome 
power politics and conflicts of interest. 
Interaction between the EU and China reflects 
their relative power positions and is therefore 
bound to display concerns about relative gains, 
making cooperation difficult. In contrast, the 
transformational logic resonates with a more 
liberal perspective. It suggests that under 
conditions of complex interdependence, rules 
and shared norms can sharply reduce conflicts of 
interest and mitigate concerns about relative 
gains through the creation of trust and reciprocal 
socialization, making enduring cooperation more 
likely. The power logic feeds into diverging 
trends; the transformational logic generates 
converging trends. The direction in which EU-
China connectivity can evolve – more 
competition or more cooperation – is moulded 
by the relative strength of diverging and 
converging trends.  
Building EU-China connectivity will not come 
easy. Growing concerns about economic security 
and relative gains, together with fundamental 
differences in their respective identities and 
societal systems, will continue to pose challenges 
on the road to concerted order-shaping. 
Policymakers and officials on both sides will need 
to engage in mutual learning if they are to 
overcome the differences that separate them. 
  
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
5 
 
#1 
 
EU-China connectivity will be a difficult 
balancing act between diverging and converging 
trends. At any point in the future, the resulting 
equilibrium will reside somewhere along a 
spectrum that extends from pure cooperation at 
one end to unrestrained competition at the other. 
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